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T his conference was convened to consider the role of competitionlaw i  light of some modem, and some not so modem,
developments in corporate structure, recognizing that the lines
between private and governmental entities are, and have always been,
indeterminate. As Professor Chris Sagers points out, the world has
never been bipolar, neither fully regulated by government nor purely
2private. The program will consider developments in six economic
*Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University Law School.
1 An earlier version of this Article was presented as Susan Beth Farmer, Modern Legal
and Legislative Developments in Antitrust Law, and the Business of Insurance,
Presentation at the International Symposium on Antitrust and Insurance, Korean
Competition Law Association (Seoul) (Nov. 7, 2008), and it was published as The
McCarran-Ferguson Exemption from the United States Antitrust Laws Recent
Developments, 18 J. KOREAN COMPETITION L. 466 (2008).
2 Chris Sagers, Much Ado About Probably Pretty Little: McCarran-Ferguson Repeal in
the Health Care Reform Effort, 28 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 325, 333 (2010); Chris Sagers,
[915]
HeinOnline  -- 89 Or. L. Rev. 915 2010-2011
OREGON LAW REVIEW
sectors, including insurance, financial institutions,
telecommunications, transportation, health care, and energy, in light
of the shifting boundaries between public and private action. Three
approaches are proposed to analyze these sectors: public-private
partnerships, government-sponsored enterprises, and standard-setting
activities. At the outset, then, it is appropriate to assess which
narrative offers the most insights for the insurance sector and to
challenge the limits of the model. There is an unstated fourth
paradigm, plain on the face of the statute, which explains the
McCarran-Ferguson Act3 and its power. Reviewing the proposed
paradigms seriatim, first, is the public-private partnership paradigm,
or P3, approach.
P3, described by Professor Michael Likosky, promotes
governmental and private industry cooperation, primarily in large
infrastructure projects, including, among other things, highways,
4
bridges, railways, and water supply projects. P3 projects are
intended to use "modest public subsidies [that] can be used to
leverage large amounts of private capital,"'5 essentially through the
lease of publicly constructed infrastructure projects to private
operators. 6 The P3 partnership model must be carefully studied to
determine whether the proposed privatization offers as many benefits
as are promised and whether there are worrisome hidden costs.7 At
Standardization and Markets: Just Exactly Who Is the Government, and Why Should
Antitrust Care?, 89 OR. L. REv. 785 (2011).
3 McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011-1015 (2006)).
4 Michael Likosky, Secretary Chu's Bank, HUFFINGTON POST (July 1, 2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-likosky/secretary-chus-bank b_224545.html.
5 Id
6 See Michael Likosky, P3s: The Problem with Tolls, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 8,
2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-likosky/p3s-the-problem-with-toll-b453
217.html; Michael Likosky, A Call for Excellent Public-Private Partnerships,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 17, 2009), http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/michael-likosky/a
-call-for-excellent-publb_216598.html; Michael Likosky, A Drinking Water-Backed
Economy, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 23, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael
-likosky/a-drinking-water-backed-e_b_177879.html; Michael Likosky, Enlisting Goldman
in Our .Recovery, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/michael-likosky/enlisting-goldman-in-our b_554894 html; Michael Likosky, Ed Rendell:
Hardest Working Man in Infrastructure, HUFFINGTON POST (July 22, 2009),
http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/michael-likosky/ed-rendell-hardest-workin-b243272
.html.
7 See Ellen Dannin, Crumbling Infrastructure, Crumbling Democracy: Infrastructure
Privatization Contracts and Their Effects on State and Local Governance, 6 Nw. J.L. &
SOC. POL'Y 47 (2011); Letter from Ellen Dannin and Phineas Baxandall, Senior Analyst
for Tax and Budget Policy at the U.S. Pub. Interest Research Grp., to Members of the
916 [Vol. 89, 915
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the end of the day, however, this model is most applicable to the
infrastructure example, in which the government-built development
project is constructed and then privatized. It offers modest insight
into competition in the insurance sector because some insurance
products are produced and benefits are provided by governmental
89entities, including, for example, flood insurance, Medicare,
Medicaid, and Social Security. I Privatization of these programs is
the subject of robust debate, but no serious P3 program has been
proposed in the sector, and there are no calls, for example, for
partnerships between insurance companies and governmental entities
as in the infrastructure sense.
The second model, government-sponsored enterprises, is a
similarly imperfect fit to the insurance industry. Government
insurance programs exist, as we have seen, but add little to the
consideration of competition in the sector.
Third, the standard-setting model may offer the most insights for
the antitrust-specific provisions of the McCarran-Ferguson exemption
for the American insurance sector. The paradigm is not novel: firms
have long engaged in cooperative behavior, including organizing
industry trade associations, exchanging information, and
promulgating industry standards. Trade associations have been a
feature of American business since early in the last century and were
favored by, among others, Theodore Roosevelt. 12  Courts have
House Transp. Comm. (June 27, 2008) (contending that the hidden costs of the proposed
seventy-five-year lease include lack of oversight and accountability, and ultimately
provide excessive subsidies from taxpayers to the private turnpike operators).
8 The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is a federal program administered by
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Created in 1968, the insurance is
available to private homeowners, businesses, and renters located in communities that have
joined the NFIP. The insurance is sold by some ninety private insurers, but the rates are
determined by the NFIP. National Flood Insurance Program Extension Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-196, 124 Stat. 1352 (2010); Bunning-Bereuter-Blumenauer Flood Insurance
Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-264, 118 Stat. 712 (2004); National Flood Insurance
Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, tit. V, 108 Stat. 2160, 2255-87 (1994); Flood
Disaster Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-234, 87 Stat. 975 (1973); National Flood
Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572 (1968). The FEMA implementing
regulations are at 44 C.F.R. §§ 187-330 (2009).
9 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395hhh (2006).
10 Id. §§ 1396-1396w-5.
11 Id. §§ 301-1397jj.
12 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, TRADE AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS:
AVOIDING THE ANTITRUST MINEFIELD (1994), GEORGE P. LAMB & CARRINGTON
SHIELDS, TRADE ASSOCIATION LAW AND PRACTICE (rev. ed. 1971). Justice Brandeis's
2011] 917
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recognized the procompetitive value and obvious risks of
associations, self-regulation, and information exchanges because
these activities may enhance or reduce competition, depending on the
particular situation. At one extreme, a trade association may not
throw the "gauzy cloak"15 of cooperation over naked cartel behavior,
ranging from price fixing to market allocation. Thus, competitors that
use their trade association to promulgate fee schedules have not
merely set industry standards but have engaged in per se illegal price
fixing. 16  Information exchanges among competitors may be pro- or
anticompetitive depending on a range of factors, so they are analyzed
under the rule of reason. Another typical role of the association is
statement in Chicago Board of Trade, a case involving the rules and regulations of a trade
association, was the first articulation of the rule of reason in antitrust analysis:
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a
test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade,
every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or
end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
13 See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comn'n, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (holding the
rule of reason is required to analyze ethical restrictions of a professional association); Nw.
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985); NCAA
v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (holding the need for some
cooperation in a college sports association justifies the rule of reason analysis, though
agreements are not necessarily legitimate under that standard); Maple Flooring Mfrs.
Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
14 See, e.g., Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (holding
that an association prohibition of competitive bidding was not justified by a public health,
safety, and welfare claim); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978)
(holding that, in the criminal context, a mens rea of specific intent is required for exchange
of price information); United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969); Am.
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921) (holding a trade association
program that required reporting of sales and price data, and at which price and output
restrictions were discussed, was unreasonable).
15 See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106
(1980) (finding that slight state involvement in the state regulation of liquor prices
confirmed that the state merely acquiesced to private price fixing).
16 Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 781-83 (1975).
17 See, e.g., United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 113 (1975) (holding
the exchange of price information is not per se illegal); Container Corp. ofAm., 393 U.S.
at 336-37 (holding that relevant factors of unreasonable restraint of trade include the
[Vol. 89, 915918
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the promulgation of industry standards. Private action that receives
governmental acquiescence to discriminatory standards is not entitled
to immunity.!s Self-regulation, on the other hand, if it comports with
due process, may not raise competition issues.' 9 The insurance sector
is characterized by data exchanges and adoption of industry standards,
including, for example, model policy provisions. Whether or not
particular activities are unlawful is analyzed under the rule of reason.
The fourth paradigm, which more precisely describes regulation
and competition in the insurance sector, is the shifting boundary
between state and federal regulation instead of a boundary between
the public and private sectors. The McCarran-Ferguson Act was
adopted to protect firms acting in the business of insurance from
federal antitrust scrutiny, but its language and impact goes far beyond
federal competition law. So broad is the exemption that the modern
effect of the Act only incidentally concerns antitrust. The majority of
modem cases concern reverse preemption, not antitrust immunity.
Fundamentally, the Act reifies the boundaries between federal and
state power; it is, at base, an allocation of power and an affirmation of
the federalism paradigm. Therefore, my argument is orthogonal to
the proposition of the conference that posits the fundamental
distinction as lying between public and private in the insurance sector.
In this sector, the distinction is between different manifestations of
public power. Moreover, the defense of the antitrust boundaries is a
skirmish, not the subject of the main purpose of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, which is, as ever, federalism.
My provisional conclusions are as follows: the antitrust exemption
is unnecessary, but even if it were eliminated, it would have protected
little. Reverse preemption, which could be viewed as mere mischief,
an unintended consequence, is, in fact, at the heart of this model and
exposes the points of the Act: preservation of the boundaries,
allocation of power, and deference among the states and federal
government.
This Article discusses, first, the antitrust immunity aspect of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, including the asserted justification for the
exemption and whether it is required in the era of modern antitrust
interpretation. Next, this Article discusses the legislation proposed to
market's structure, nature of the prices exchanged, and other controlling circumstances);
Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925); Maple Flooring,
268 U.S. 563.
18 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499-500 (1988).
19 See Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 364-67 (1963).
9192011]
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repeal the exemption and why it has failed, and it offers comparative
examples of competition and exemption in the insurance sector from
the European Union. Finally, this Article concludes by returning to
the first principles of the entire McCarran-Ferguson Act, which reach
more broadly than antitrust and implicate the structure of federal and
state authority.
I
INSURANCE AND COMPETITION: THE STATUTORY AND COMMON
LAW BACKGROUND
The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides a limited exemption from
the American federal antitrust laws. It is a complex and controversial
doctrine that seeks to chart an appropriate balance between
competition and the need of firms in the insurance industry to share
information that may be competitively sensitive and to allow the firms
to provide better services to their customers. Effective antitrust
enforcement and information exchanges among competitors may,
depending on the circumstances, promote consumer welfare.
Consumer welfare is generally recognized as the touchstone and
dominant goal of competition laws and enforcement.
Additionally, the analysis contemplated by the statutory scheme
directly implicates the allocation of competence between the federal
and state governments. Thus, the allocation of power and deference
is at the center of this doctrine, and issues of federalism predominate.
This facet of the American political system is relevant for other
jurisdictions: whether similar antitrust exemptions are necessary in
their circumstances.
Therefore, in analyzing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, this Article
starts from the perspective that the competitive process usually
promotes consumer welfare in the form of increased output, lower
prices, and allocative efficiency, and this process may serve
distributive goals. Regulation is appropriate to deal with -market
failures and true natural monopolies and to advance social welfare.
Antitrust "exemptions should be made only where 'compelling
evidence of the unworkability of competition or a clearly paramount
social purpose' exists, and any exemptions should use the 'least
anticompetitive method of achieving the regulatory objective."' 20
20 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 336
(2007) (quoting NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND
PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 177 (1979)),
920 [Vol. 89, 915
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This Article discusses recent developments in McCarran-Ferguson
law and policy in four areas.
First, there has been considerable debate among the antitrust bar,
the insurance industry, enforcement agencies, and consumer
representatives on the merits and potential competitive risks of the
McCarran-Ferguson exemption. The American Bar Association has
long proposed a compromise position to replace the existing
exemption, but this proposal, too, has never been adopted. The
Antitrust Modernization Commission held extensive hearings on all
aspects of substantive antitrust doctrine and enforcement, including
exemptions and antitrust immunity, and it issued a report warning
against excessive exemptions, but it did not recommend specific
reform or repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The National
Association of Attorneys General also opposes industry-specific
legislation that would weaken antitrust enforcement, and it therefore
supports a complete repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson exemption for
the insurance industry. National consumer groups join in
recommending total repeal, while the insurance industry supports a
strong exemption. Finally, some have approached the federalism
question directly and urge repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and
substitution of federal, not state, regulation of the insurance industry
and ultimate preemption of federal antitrust laws in deference to a
national regulatory scheme.
Second, congressional hearings have contributed to the debate.
Several bills have been introduced and various committees have held
periodic hearings, but no legislation has been adopted by the U.S.
Congress. The general trend of proposed legislation began with
recommendations to modify the scope of the immunity and the
particular type of insurance products covered. Then, the trend moved
toward complete repeal of the exemption. During the last Congress,
there were calls for repeal and permissive federalization of insurance
regulation, effectively shifting the boundaries of federal and state
power, but those proposals failed to be adopted and have not been
reintroduced.
Third, there have been few recent Supreme Court cases but many,
and conflicting, cases from lower federal and state courts. The
overall effect of these cases has been to complicate the already
complex state of the law. To the extent that the McCarran-Ferguson
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report reconmendation/amc-finalreport
.pdf.
9212011]1
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Act was designed to clarify the balance of state and federal power to
regulate and to set a clear substantive standard, the project has failed.
Fourth, antitrust immunity is generally discouraged by
international policy groups, including the International Competition
Network (ICN) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). However, a modified version of the
American immunity covering information exchanges among firms in
the insurance industry is the subject of a block exemption of the
European Commission. The original block exemption, covering four
categories of agreements, was adopted in 2003 and was due to sunset
in 2010, until it was partially extended to 2017. As part of its
oversight responsibilities, the European Commission's enforcement
agency, Directorate General for Competition of the European
Commission (DG Comp), conducted a sector inquiry into the
insurance sector and opened a public consultation into the need for
the block exemption. DG Comp concluded, as a preliminary matter,
that claims for the block exemption were unpersuasive, and it was
inclined to allow the block exemption.to expire and rely on the
general competition rules to protect necessary and procompetitive
activities in the business of insurance. However, after a thorough
review, the Commission decided to renew two of the exemptions:
joint collection and distribution of risk tables and studies, as well as
some risk pools. Agreements on "standard policy conditions (SPCs)
and security devices" were not renewed. 2 '
Thus, the future of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and review of
similar exemptions by other jurisdictions implicates important issues
of substantive antitrust law and policy, legislative priorities,
federalism concerns, and international harmonization.
II
THE DEBATE AND COMMENTARY: PRO- AND ANTICOMPETITIVE
EFFECTS
The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides an absolute exemption from
the federal antitrust liability for activities that meet three conditions:
(1) the conduct must be the "business of insurance"; (2) it must be
"regulated" by state law; and (3) it must not consist of "boycott,
21 Communication from the Commission on the Application of Article 101(3) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Certain Categories of Agreements,
Decisions and Concerted Practices in the Insurance Sector, 2010 O.J. (C 82) 20.
[Vol. 89, 915922
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coercion or intimidation."22 In an act of reverse preemption, the
McCarran-Ferguson Act also provides that state laws regulating the
business of insurance preempt any other federal law unless that
23federal law relates specifically to the business of insurance.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act was a direct response by Congress to
a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly holding that the
insurance industry and its various activities were conducted in
interstate commerce and were, therefore, affirmatively subject to the
prohibitions of federal antitrust law.24 Thus, the McCarran-Ferguson
Act constitutes an important alteration of the shape of American
antitrust law, which has been identified as the "Magna Carta of free
enterprise" and was dedicated to protecting competition and the
competitive process over the individual competitors.25
American antitrust analysis has evolved since the McCarran-
Ferguson exemption was thought to be necessary to protect the
insurance industry and permit it to serve its customers without fear of
overzealous antitrust enforcement. By approximately the time the
McCarran-Ferguson Act was adopted in 1945, the Supreme Court had
created per se rules against horizontal price-fixing,26 market
27 2829allocation, boycotts,28 vertical resale price maintenance, and tying
22 McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No. 79-15, §§ 2-3, 59 Stat. 33, 34 (1945) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012-1013 (2006). The Act provides:
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or
which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically
relates to the business of insurance; Provided, That after June 30, 1948, . . . the
Sherman Act,... the Clayton Act, and . .. the Federal Trade Commission Act, . .
. shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business
is not regulated by State law.
Id. § 2(b).
Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable
to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or
intimidation.
Id. § 3(b).
23 See id. § 2(b).
24 United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 561 (1944).
25 United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
26 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
27 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); see also Palmer v.
BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990); Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596; United
States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,
341 U.S. 593 (1951).
28 Fashion Originator's Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); E. States Retail
Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
2011] 923
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30arrangements. Interference with market prices was a particular
concern, and "price fixing" was defined broadly to include uniform
prices, maximum or minimum prices, and market manipulation.3 '
"[Prices] are fixed because they are agreed upon," said the Supreme
Court in Socony- Vacuum, and. a conspiracy "formed for the purpose
. . . of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price ...
is illegal per se."
Agreements among competitors to merely exchange information
were also risky, depending on the kind of information, the
participants, and the use of the data. Sharing information may
literally constitute price fixing, it may facilitate price fixing, or it may
be necessary to create a new product and satisfy consumer demand.
The important issue in each situation is whether there was an
agreement, express or implied, to restrain trade. 3 3 Direct exchanges
of current or future prices between competitors themselves is most
competitively risky, especially in concentrated industries, and
Supreme Court opinions suggested that such exchanges could be per
se illegal.34 Because the insurance sector relies on data collection and
dissemination, standard setting, and other joint activities, potential
antitrust challenges were perceived as a threat to the industry. 5
The shock to the insurance industry finding itself subject to these
rigid antitrust standards by the operation of constitutional
jurisprudence must have been extreme. The business of insurance
had a long relationship with state regulatory systems and felt a need to
share statistics and dAta as part of its standard business practice, and
states guard the boundaries of their power jealously. This customary
business practice was abruptly called into, question by South-Eastern
Underwriters, and the obvious solution would have been to return to
prior practice by granting an antitrust exemption and leaving state
regulation in place.
Modern antitrust analysis has developed since the original
enunciation of strict per se rules in cases involving horizontal
29 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled by
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (holding that the
rule of reason applied to vertical price restraints).
30 Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
31 Socony- Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 222-23.
32 Id
33 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1983).
34 United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337-38 (1969).
35 See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
924 [Vol. 89, 915
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agreements. This evolution began when the Supreme Court refused
to per se condemn a technical horizontal price-fixing agreement that
efficiently created a new product demanded by consumers in
Broadcast Music.3  While per se condemnation remains appropriate
for naked cartel behavior, the modem analysis is based more on actual
competitive effects of an agreement than on rigid categories. This
standard was perhaps best expressed by Justice Breyer, concurring in
California Dental, as follows: "(1) What is the specific restraint at
issue? (2) What are its likely anticompetitive effects? (3) Are there
offsetting procompetitive justifications? (4) Do the parties have
sufficient market power to make a difference?" 3 7
Modem understanding of the risks and benefits of data
dissemination has also evolved since the early cases. Specific facts
about the particular information and circumstances of the exchange
are highly relevant; it is less competitively sensitive if a third party
collects and disseminates the data, if it contains historical rather than
current or future prices, if it is aggregated rather than identified by
firm, and if there is a legitimate procompetitive purpose for the
exchange. Modem antitrust interpretation is clear: the exchange of
information is not a per se violation of the antitrust laws in itself, and
39
all of the facts should be evaluated under the rule of reason.
At the end of the day, then, modem antitrust analysis has largely
evolved to the point where most of the procompetitive data collection
and standard setting of the business of insurance would be justified
under the modem rule of reason. Effective state regulation that
mandated and actively supervised other, potentially problematic
behavior would be protected by the state action doctrine. The issue
for legislators and interest groups is whether or not a special
exemption for the business of insurance remains necessary.
Antitrust and economic commentators have largely concluded that
market competition tends to produce better economic and social
outcomes than regulation by any level of government. Congress has
the raw power to limit the federal antitrust laws by adopting
exemptions and by granting immunity in particular cases, to particular
industries, or based on general principles. However, because
36 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
37 Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 782 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
38 See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); Container Corp. ofAm.,
393 U.S. 333; Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
39 See United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'1 Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 138 (1975).
2011] 925
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immunities and antitrust exemptions permit firms to conspire
unchecked by antitrust enforcement in the face of ineffective
regulation, they should be adopted only when necessary. Congress
should examine the evidence proving that an exemption is necessary
and then determine whether, on balance, the exemption will protect
consumer welfare and threaten less harm than competition and
antitrust enforcement against illegal activities. If Congress concludes
that a particular industry or market is not amenable to competition,
then the traditional solution is regulation. When regulation is
necessary to deal with market failures or natural monopolies, it should
be efficient, effective, and carried out by the appropriate level of
government.
The views of the Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC), 4 0
41 42the American Bar Association, state antitrust enforcers, consumer
protection groups,43 and insurer representatives" on the continued
need for the McCarran-Ferguson exemption appear to diverge. The
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) testified in
favor of retaining the federal antitrust exemption and leaving
regulation of the insurance sector to state regulators.4 5 A regime of
strong oversight and regulation, in the view of state regulatory
officials, would be sufficient to maintain competition and protect
40 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, supra note 20.
41 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, COMMENTS TO THE ANTITRUST
MODERNIZATION ACT REGARDING THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT (2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-comments/2006/04-06/amc-McCarranFerguson.pdf;
The McCarran-Ferguson Act: Implications of Repealing the Insurers' Antitrust
Exemption: Hearing Before the S. Jud. Comm., 109th Cong. 96 (2006) [hereinafter
Exemption Repeal Hearing] (statement of Donald Klawiter, Chair, ABA Section of
Antitrust Law).
42 See, e.g., Exemption Repeal Hearing, supra note 41, at 4 (statement of Elinor
Hoffman, Assistant Att'y Gen. of New York).
43 See id. at 8 (statement of J. Robert Hunter, Director of Insurance, Consumer
Federation of America).
44 See, e.g., id. at 50 (statement of the Hon. Marc Racicot, President, American Insurers
Ass'n); id. at 140 (statement of Kevin Thompson, Sr. Vice President, Insurance Services
Office); Letter from Karen Ignagni, President & CEO, America's Health Ins. Plans (AHIP)
to the Hon. Tom Perriello and the Hon. Betsy Markey, U.S. House of Representatives
(Feb. 18, 2010), available at http://americanhealthsolution.org/assets/Uploads/Blog/Letter
-McCarran-Ferguson-02.18.2010.pdf.
45 See, e.g., Exemption Repeal Hearing, supra note 41, at 108 (statement of Michael
McRaith, Illinois Director of Insurance, National Association of Insurance
Commissioners); Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, NAIC Tells Antitrust
Commission that McCarran Exemption Fosters Competition (Oct. 18, 2006), available at
http://www.naic.org/Releases/2006_docs/naicantitrust exemption fosters competition
.htm.
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consumers, so federal antitrust enforcement would be unnecessary.4 6
The states47 and consumer groupS48 support complete repeal of the
exemption, the ABA 4 9 recommends a new federal law protecting safe
harbors, and the AMC 50 generally disapproves of industry-specific
exemptions. However, all of their policy positions converge on key
points:
* Competition, in the form of effective antitrust enforcement, has
been critical to the success of the American market economy.
* Congress may displace market competition by creating antitrust
exemptions and immunities but should do so only when
convinced that the market cannot work and regulation is the best
way to achieve consumer welfare goals, and regulation is a
second-best solution.
* Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause to
preempt state regulation, and it should exercise that power only
after consideration of issues of federalism.
* Special antitrust exemptions for specific industries are
disfavored and should be granted only when necessary, should
be limited, and should interfere with competition as little as
possible.
* Sharing of certain data, standard setting and development of
standard forms, forming joint underwriting associations, and
other cooperative behavior may be important for the business of
insurance and in the public interest, and they are subject to the
antitrust rule. of reason.
* Antitrust analysis should consider the likely procompetitive
benefits and anticompetitive risks in appraising cooperative
behavior in the insurance industry, and predictability and
certainty are relevant considerations.
46 See Exemption Repeal Hearing, supra note 41, at 4 (statement of Elinor Hoffman,
Assistant Att'y Gen. of New York).
47 Id.
48 See id. at 8 (statement of J. Robert Hunter, Director of Insurance, Consumer
Federation of America).
49 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 41.
50 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, supra note 20.
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III
FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 5 1
Although antitrust exemptions have generally been criticized, there
has been no consensus strong enough to repeal or significantly modify
the McCarran-Ferguson Act in the sixty-three years since its adoption.
Efforts to clarify the scope of the immunity began in the 1990s and
ultimately involved multilateral negotiations, including some between
segments of the insurance industry and national consumer protection
groups.52 The goal was modest: neither total repeal nor strengthening
of the immunity provisions.53 The draft legislation that emerged from
the multiparty negotiations, House Bill 9, would have substituted a
list of safe harbors for the poorly defined McCarran-Ferguson
exemption.5 4  It was opposed by other segments of the insurance
industry, notably small firms, that were concerned that the safe
harbors were insufficient protection and would put small firms at a
disadvantage compared to large companies.5 5  The House Judiciary
Committee passed and favorably reported the bill, but no further
56
action was taken, and the bill failed to pass.
More than a decade later, safe harbor bills modeled after House
Bill 9 and a variety of other approaches to deal with competitive
problems in the insurance industry were introduced in the House and
the Senate. Several of those recent initiatives were broader,
proposing, complete repeal of the antitrust exemption or repeal and
substitution of federal regulation. The antitrust repeal provision is
found in a pair of bills introduced in 2007 and sent to the Senate and
House Judiciary Committees for consideration. Senate Bill 618 and
House Bill 1081 would have completely repealed the antitrust
exemption but retained the reverse preemption language of
congressional deference to state laws that regulate the business of
insurance.57 Those bills would have left the insurance industry in the
51 Or the lack thereof, shows the real, federalism meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.
52 Craig A. Berrington, Congress, Once Again, Debates Insurers' Antitrust Exemption
Under McCarran-Ferguson Act, 22 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER i, 3 (2007), available at
http://www.wlf.org/upload/05-25-07berrington.pdf.
53 See id.
54 See Insurance Competitive Pricing Act of 1991, H.R. 9, 102d Cong. (1991).
5s Berrington, supra note 52.
56 Id
57 Insurance Industry Competition Act of 2007, S. 618, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1081,
110th Cong. (2007).
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same position as other American industries with respect to antitrust
enforcement: the antitrust laws do not preempt state law. States may
protect private firms from antitrust liability under the state action
doctrine if the state affirmatively expresses the will to do so and
actively supervises the activity.
Other proposals were considerably more nuanced; Senate Bill 1525
provided limited immunity for medical malpractice insurance unless
the firms had engaged in bid rigging, price fixing, or market
allocation, which are among the most serious kinds of anticompetitive
58conspiracies. Another modified repeal bill, the Insurance
Competitive Pricing Act of 2005, would have maintained an
exemption from the federal antitrust laws for activities in the business
of insurance regulated by state law except for price fixing, market
allocation, tying arrangements, or monopolization.59 The proposed
modifications of the exemption were much broader than the
McCarran-Ferguson Act's current exclusion for boycott, coercion,
and intimidation, which remains in the proposed bills.60 The list of
nonexempt activities nearly swallows the exemption, apparently
covering every antitrust violation except, possibly, nonprice vertical
restraints and mergers, so the bill amounted to a repeal of the
61
exemption. Senate Bill 2401 additionally carved out three safe
harbors: areas in which covered insurers may engage in collective
62action and be exempt from antitrust enforcement. The safe harbors
resemble the ABA's list of recommended information-sharing
practices: collecting and distributing historical loss data, making loss
development factors based on historical data, and performing
63actuarial services that do not restrain trade. Agreement on trend
factors is specifically excluded from information exchange and data
manipulation that are otherwise permitted.64
ss Medical Malpractice Insurance Antitrust Act of 2005, S. 1525, 109th Cong. § 2
(2005).
59 Insurance Competitive Pricing Act of 2005, H.R. 2401, 109th Cong. § 2 (2007).
60 Cf McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No. 79-15, § 3(b), 59 Stat. 33, 34 (1945)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (2006)) ("Nothing contained in this chapter shall render
the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or
act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.").
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Finally, Senate Bill 2509 made the most radical and far-reaching
proposal to change the current regulatory situation. That approach
would have taken back insurance regulation from the states, offered
an optional national regulatory system, and eliminated federal
65antitrust immunity. That approach was premised on the view that
the modern insurance industry is truly interstate, if not global, in
nature, and therefore, continued state regulation is inefficient and
ineffective. The cosponsors, writing in The Wall Street Journal on
September 23, 2008, warned that "[1]etting this 19th-century
regulatory model govern a 21st-century global marketplace" is
dangerously fragmented and risky for insurance consumers,
shareholders, and the financial system itself.66 Citing the recent
failure of AIG, the senators and representatives who cosponsored
Senate Bill 2509 and a companion house bill warned that individual
state regulators could not competently oversee firms that cross state
and national borders.67 For example, the article pointed out that AIG
had 209 subsidiaries, but only twelve were within the jurisdiction of
New York State regulators. According to the bills' sponsors, New
York's power was too weak to reach the entire company; it failed, and
the failure of AIG resulted in an. $85 billion federal bailout.6 The
bills would have permitted, but not required, insurers to vacate their
state charters and be rechartered as a national insurer, a national
agency, or a "federally licensed insurance producer."69 These new
national entities would have been subject to uniform federal
regulation in the form of a commissioner of national insurance, which
is more completely defined in the proposed legislation.70  All state
regulation, including "licensing, examination, reporting, regulation, or
other supervision relating to the sale, solicitation, or negotiation of
insurance, to the underwriting of insurance, or to any other insurance
operations" would be eliminated.7 As a consequence of ending state
oversight, the national entities- would have lost their antitrust
exemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, except for an important
65 National Insurance Act of 2006, S. 2509, 109th Cong. (2006). The companion House
bill was H.R. 6225, 109th Cong. (2006).
66 John Sununu et al., Op-Ed., Insurance Companies Need a Federal Regulator, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 23, 2008, http://online.wsl.com/article/SB122212967854565511.html.
67 Id.
68 Id
69 S. 2509 § 1102(b).
70 See id § 1102.
71 Id. § 1125(a).
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safe harbor. The new exemption would have protected "the
development, dissemination, or use of standard insurance policy
forms (including, standard endorsements, addendums, and policy
language), [and] activities incidental thereto, by National Insurers,
National Agencies, and federally licensed insurance producers."72
This approach to the McCarran-Ferguson Act recognized that the
fundamental nature of the Act was to allocate power between states
and the federal government. This allocation included the antitrust
exemption for the business of insurance to the extent that it was
regulated by the state and did not constitute boycott, coercion, or
intimidation, 7 3 but it went further to reverse-preempt other federal
legislation that does not specifically relate to the business of insurance
in favor of state insurance law.7 4
In the 110th Congress, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a
hearing on Senate Bill 2401 and on the more limited Senate Bill
1525, and it heard testimony from several representatives from a
variety of interest groups.76 Unsurprisingly, representatives from the
American Insurance Association, Insurance Services Office, and
National Association of Insurance Commissioners opposed repeal
of the McCarran-Ferguson immunity and described the necessity for
legal certainty, the benefits of information exchange, and the value of
state regulation. A representative of the American Bar Associationso
recommended repeal of the exemption and substitution of a set of safe
harbors in accord with the longstanding ABA policy. Finally, a
representative of a state antitrust enforcement bureau, the New York
Attorney General's Office, and the insurance specialist of the
72 Id § 1702(a)(1).
73 McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No. 79-15, §§ 2(b), 3(b), 59 Stat. 33, 34 (1945)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012(b), 1013(b) (2006)).
74 Id § 2(b).
75 Medical Malpractice Insurance Act of 2005, S. 1525, 110th Cong. (2007).
76 The McCarran-Ferguson Act: Implications of Repealing the Insurers' Antitrust
Exemption, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006).
77 See Exemption Repeal Hearing, supra note 41, at 50 (statement of the Hon. Marc
Racicot, President American Insurers Ass'n).
78 See id at 140 (statement of Kevin Thompson, Sr. Vice President, Insurance Services
Office).
79 See id. at 108 (statement of Michael McRaith, Illinois Director of Insurance, National
Association of Insurance Commissioners).
80 See id. at 96 (statement of Donald Klawiter, Chair, ABA Section of Antitrust Law).
81 See id at 4 (statement of Elinor Hoffman, Assistant Att'y Gen. of New York).
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Consumer Federation of America82 recommended complete repeal of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act and reliance, if necessary, on the state
action doctrine to protect legitimate activities in the insurance
industry.
With the expiration of the 110th Congress, at noon on January 4,
2009, the 111th Congress has considered only limited repeals of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act and has adopted none. Senate Bill 3217,83
introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy, would have repealed the
McCarran-Ferguson antitrust exemption only for health insurers.
That bill is similar to, but broader than, Senator Leahy's 2009
proposed legislation, Senate Bill 1681.84 House Bill 4626,ss the
Health Insurance Industry Fair Competition Act, also ending the
McCarran-Ferguson antitrust exemption for health insurers, passed
406 to 19 on February 24, 2010. House Bill 396287 would have
repealed the McCarran-Ferguson antitrust exemption for price fixing,
market allocation, monopolization, or attempted monopolization.
Efforts to repeal or modify the McCarran-Ferguson antitrust.
exemption have been sporadic and ineffective in the sixty-three years
since its adoption. However, the modest flurry of recent activity,
including committee hearings, suggests that federal legislation may
again move to the fore. The fear of expansive antitrust interpretation
that motivated the original exemption should be lessened by three
developments. First, modem antitrust law treats most information
exchanges and procompetitive horizontal agreements under the rule of
reason, so it shouid not chill necessary coordinated activity; second,
private acts done pursuant to an affirmatively expressed and actively
supervised state program of regulation are protected by the state
82 See id. at 8 (statement of J. Robert Hunter, Director of Insurance, Consumer
Federation of America).
83 Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. (2010).
84 Health Insurance Industry Antitrust Enforcement Act of 2009, S. 1681, 111th Cong.
(2009).
85 Health Insurance Industry Fair Competition Act, H.R. 4626, 111th Cong. (2010).
86 Exemptions: House Passes Repeal of Exemption for Health Insurers on Bipartisan
Vote, 98 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 232, (Feb. 26, 2010). -
87 Preservation of Access to Care for Medical Beneficiaries and Pension Relief Act of
2010, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (2010).
88 Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006); Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756
(1999); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Broad. Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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action doctrine; and third, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine exempts
acts of government petitioning.90 Finally, the ongoing financial crisis
may encourage Congress to review the balance of federal and state
authority in the business of insurance. Congress may, under the
Commerce Clause, choose to preempt any state activity in a field, and
the evolution of the business of insurance from a local to an
international industry may persuade Congress that the balance should
be realigned in the federal favor.
IV
JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides:
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the
regulation or taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair,
or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax
upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the
business of insurance: Provided, That after January 1, 1948, the Act
of July 2, 1890, as amended, known. as the Sherman Act, and the
Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act,
and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade
Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the business of
insur ce to the extent that such business is not regulated by State
Law.
The text of the McCarran-Ferguson Act thus establishes two
different exemptions from federal regulation. Section 2(a) and the
first clause of section 2(b) deal with both classic and reverse
preemption, while the second clause of section 2(b), following
"Provided," is a classic preemption provision dealing only with
antitrust law. This latter provision is the antitrust immunity provision.
These sections are related and use common terms and concepts (i.e.,
"business of insurance" and "regulated by the State") but arise in
different legal contexts. The first, or classic, reverse preemption issue
89 FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992); Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
90 Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
91 McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No. 79-15, § 2, 59 Stat. 33, 34 (1945) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2006)).
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is the subject of the vast majority of modem cases, while the antitrust
immunity provision arises relatively less frequently. To the extent
that American courts disagree as to the proper interpretation of the
common concepts, the result will be confusion in the meaning of
both.
Under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution,
Congress has the power to enact federal laws that override and
preempt state statutes. Such reemption may be express, by explicit
language in a federal statute, or implied, where the state and federal
statutory schemes conflict irreconcilably.93  In addition, Congress
may create a comprehensive system of federal regulation that
completely occupies the field and ousts state law and regulation. 94
These comprehensive federal regulatory schemes preempt the states
from legislating in the field, even if particular state laws do not
conflict with federal law or policy.9 5  It has long been recognized,
however, that federal antitrust laws were not intended to preempt state
antitrust laws and that federal antitrust regulation does not pervasively
occupy the field and exclude state antitrust activity. Indeed, several
state antitrust laws preceded the federal legislation,9 7 and members of
the 1890 Congress that passed the Sherman Act envisioned the federal
antitrust law as a supplement to state antitrust enforcement.98
The McCarran-Ferguson Act first declares a "reverse preemption"
rule, providing that states have the power to legislate and regulate in
the field of insurance and that, as a general matter, federal statutes
will not preempt state laws that regulate the "business of insurance."99
However, reaffirming classic preemption standards, the McCarran-
Ferguson Act then provides that a federal statute that "specifically
92 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
93 McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
94 See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
95 Id
96 E.g. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989); Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 131-33 (1978); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,
336 U.S. 490,495 (1949).
97 David Millon, The First Antitrust Statute, 29 WASiBURN L.J. 141, 141 (1990)
("Kansas enacted the first general antitrust law in 1889. No less than eleven other states
passed various forms of antitrust legislation before Congress approved the Sherman Act in
1890.").
98 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890) (statement of Mr. Sherman) ("[The Sherman Act was to]
supplement the enforcement of... statute law by the courts of the several States . . . .").
99 McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No. 79-15, § 2, 59 Stat. 33, 34 (1945) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2006)).
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relates to the business of insurance" does preempt the state law on the
same subject.' 00 The overall effect of this section grants states wide
discretion to regulate the insurance sector unless specifically trumped
by federal law concerning the sector. Congress chose not to legislate
to the full extent of its commerce power over the business of
insurance, but rather to defer to states in their regulatory role, with the
option of preemption by specific federal statute in the insurance
field.'o'
This section of the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not address the
applicability of federal antitrust law to the insurance industry. First,
the Sherman,to2 Clayton,'os and Federal Trade Commission Acts' 0 4
do not "specifically" relate to insurance or any other industry.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has long held that the federal antitrust
laws were not intended to preempt, and do not preempt, state law. os
Recent cases on the McCarran-Ferguson Act fall into two
categories. First, many claim immunity from the federal antitrust
laws under section 2(b) of the McCarran Act.1 0 6 Second, the majority
of recent cases involve claims of "reverse preemption," in which
parties attempt to use the McCarran-Ferguson Act to have other, non-
antitrust federal law claims dismissed in favor of state law. 0 7
The antitrust immunity found in the second clause of section 2(b),
which effectively operates as preemption and a clawback provision,
applies to the business of insurance only to the extent that the
business of insurance is not regulated by the states. Thus, Congress
may specifically regulate insurance and preempt state laws governing
the insurance sector. If, however, the states are regulating the
business of insurance, the federal antitrust laws are reverse-preempted
by state regulation. The antitrust exemption legislates in the negative,
providing that the insurance sector is subject to federal antitrust law
only if the state has chosen not to regulate. This exemption also
100 Id. § 2(b).
lo1 See id.
102 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006)).
103 Clayton Antitrust Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2006)).
104 Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006)).
105 See cases cited supra note 96.
106 See infra notes 115-123 and accompanying text.
107 See infra notes 124-132 and accompanying text.
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contains a savings clause; though the Act grants an antitrust
exemption, that exemption does not cover the substantive antitrust
violations of boycott, coercion, or intimidation. os
In short, Congress may choose to federalize the field and regulate
the insurance industry in whole or in part. If Congress acts in such a
manner, it must do so "specifically."' 09 Congressional power to do so
is clear; Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause to
legislate. Interpretation of the Commerce Clause evolved significantly
during the twentieth century, and that realignment of federal and state
power led directly to enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. As
the definition of commerce was originally construed narrowly by the
Supreme Court, even insurance was held not to constitute commerce.
Therefore, states were free to legislate on the business of insurance
unhampered by federal preemption.o10  By the time of the South-
Eastern Underwriters case in 1944, the definition of "commerce" was
expanding. It finally reached its apex in cases holding the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 constitutional as a proper exercise of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause, before it was
restricted again in 1995.112 Even modem constitutional jurisprudence
would, however, recognize that the business of insurance is an
activity in commerce and subject to federal regulation.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act anticipated this development and
reserved for the federal government the power to oust state regulation
of insurance entirely. If Congress did so, state regulation would be
preempted and the antitrust exemption would evaporate because the
business of insurance is exempt from the antitrust laws only "to the
extent that such business is . . . regulated by State law."' 
1 3
The Act is not a model of clarity and uses the terms of art
"business of insurance" four times and "such business" twice in
section 2, and it refers to state "regulation" three times, but the Act
fails to define these crucial terms.114 Therefore, it is left to the courts
to define those terms, to explain the reach and limits of a convoluted
los See McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No. 79-15, § 3(b), 59 Stat. 33, 34 (1945)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (2006)).
109 See id.
110 See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 184-85 (1868).
111 E.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 259 (1964); Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298 (1964).
112 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
113 McCarran-Ferguson Act § 2(b).
114 Id. § 2.
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statute, and to seek to follow the congressional will in allocating state
and federal power.
The "business of insurance" has been litigated both in the antitrust
immunity and reverse preemption contexts. In the antitrust immunity
context, the term is interpreted broadly. Courts continue to employ
the three-part Royal Drug"' and Pirenol 6 tests to define "business
of insurance," and recent cases have not altered these factors.' 1 7
Therefore, lower courts must determine, on a case-by-case basis,
whether or not challenged activity constitutes the "business of
insurance," considering (1) whether the activity involves underwriting
or a spreading of risk, (2) whether it involves a relationship between
the insurer and the policy holder, and (3) whether the activity involves
entities within the insurance industry.118  Writing standard form
contracts and agreements and refusing to deal except on those
contracts is "the business of insurance." 1 9 Dealings with joint
underwriting organizations, whether through referral or concerted
refusals not served outside the joint underwriting association,
constitute the "business of insurance."1 2 0  Workers' compensation-
rating organizations, health maintenance organizations and health
maintenance look-alike programs are all entities in the "business of
insurance." 1 2 1 On the other hand, arranging third-party services has
been held not to be the "business of insurance." 1 2 Federal courts
have held that the "business of insurance" includes rate setting,
marketing, and pricing, but it does not include steering, bid rigging, or
bank-issued debt cancellation contracts. 12 3
The extent of the "business of insurance" also arises in non-
antitrust reverse preemption cases. This provision reverses the usual
rule of federal preemption in the business of insurance to protect state
115 Grp. Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
116 Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
117 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 782 (1993).
118 Pireno, 458 U.S. at 129.
119 See SEC v. Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969).
120 Arroyo-Melecio v. Puerto Rican Am. Ins. Co., 398 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2005).
121 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
122 Pireno, 458 U.S. 119; Grp. Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205
(1979).
123 See Arroyo-Melecio, 398 F.3d 56; 9 EARL W. KINTNER & JOSEPH P. BAUER,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 70.5 (1989).
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regulation of that sector and to prohibit implied preemption. 124In
this context, defendants typically argue that the federal regulation
does not relate to the business of insurance, so it should be preempted
in favor of state law.125 State anti-arbitral provisions have been used
to reverse-preempt a federal arbitration act in one federal court,126 but
an international arbitration treaty was not used in that way in
another.127 Continued confusion or conflict among the courts in
defining the "business of insurance" reduces certainty and
predictability, which could adversely affect procompetitive
information sharing and other joint activities in the insurance sector.
Federal laws may regulate the business of insurance unless they
"invalidate, impair, or supersede" state laws in the sector.128 If the
federal law has that prohibited effect, then the state laws regulating
the business of insurance reverse-preempt federal non-antitrust
law.129 The Supreme Court recently defined the standard for
interference with a two-part test: (1) there must be a direct conflict
between federal and state law, and (2) the federal law must frustrate
or interfere with the state policy or administration. 13 0 The Supreme
Court permitted RICO claims against insurance companies because
there is no direct conflict and because the federal remedy did not
impair the state remedial scheme.' 3 ' Lower federal courts have
applied this standard to hold that a federal prosecution of an insurance
executive for health care fraud was not reverse-preempted by
Oklahoma's insurance regulations because there were no direct
conflicts between state and federal criminal laws, and federal banking
laws permitted banks to sell insurance, though state laws prohibited
124 U.S. Dep't of the Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 507 (1993) ("[The McCarran-
Ferguson Act] overturns the normal rules of preemption."); id. at 507 n.7 ("[N]o existing
law and no future law should, by mere implication, be applied to the business of
insurance." (quoting 91 CONG. REC. 1487 (1945) (statement of Mr. Mahoney))).
125 See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Simon, No. 1:07-cv-0899-
LJM-WTL, 2007 WL 3047128 *1, *6-7 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 18, 2007).
126 Goshawk Dedicated v. Portsmouth Settlement Co. I, 466 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (N.D. Ga.
2006).
127 Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 543 F.3d 744
(5th Cir. 2008).
128 McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No. 79-15, § 2(b), 59 Stat. 33, 34 (1945) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006)).
129 Id.
130 Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 310 (1999).
131 Id. at 311 (holding that civil RICO claims were not precluded by the McCarran-
Ferguson Act).
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such sales.132 The Humana standard gives Congress more power to
"interfere" with state insurance regulation and limits the reverse
preemption effect. This relatively robust standard could bleed into
the antitrust immunity section of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and
require state regulation to be active and substantive in order to protect
the insurance sector from federal antitrust liability.
V
INSIGHTS FROM COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW: THE STATUS OF
SPECIFIC IMMUNITY FOR THE INSURANCE SECTOR
International antitrust laws and exemptions offer insights into the
antitrust-specific exemption embodied in the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, and they offer a useful comparison. The European Union, now
comprising twenty-seven member states, was founded as the
European Economic Community, creating a common market by the
Treaty of Rome in 1957.133 Competition policy was recognized in
the founding documents as central to the success of the European
project and the antitrust provisions. 13 4  Articles 101 and 102 have
been interpreted as generally consistent with the American antitrust
laws. Whether or not the European Union is properly described as a
federal system, a similar allocation of power exists between the
European Union and its member states, each with respective areas of
competence.135 Competition law enforcement had originally been the
132 United States v. Redcorn, 528 F.3d 727, 736 (10th Cir. 2008).
133 Treaty Establishing European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11.
134 Treaty on European Union Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, March 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C
83) 1 [hereinafter European Constitution]. Formerly Articles 81 and 82, the Treaty was
revised and renumbered with the Treaty of Lisbon. This document is sometimes referred
to as the European Constitution.
135 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47. Title I identifies areas of Union competence and
shared competence. Id. at 50. For example, Article 3 provides that the Union has
exclusive competence in the areas of customs union, monetary policy for the member
states that have adopted the euro, common commercial policy, international agreements,
and competition rules for the functioning of the internal market, among other areas. Id at
51. Article 4 provides that shared competence is exercised in the areas of the internal
market, social policy, consumer protection, transport, and energy, among other areas. Id.
at 51-52; see also European Constitution, supra note 134, at art. 4 ("Pursuant to the
principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual
respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties."); ELEANOR
Fox & DANIEL CRANE, GLOBAL ISSUES IN ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION LAW 424
(2010).
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province of the Commission, which had exclusive authority to
investigate and enforce the competition articles of the treaty, to
promote liberalization of regulated industries, and to enforce the
treaty articles limiting state aid.136 The Directorate General for
Competition of the European Commission (DG Comp) reformed its
enforcement system in 2003, and it now authorizes national
enforcement agencies to enforce, and national courts to apply, the
European Union's competition articles as well as national antitrust
laws.' 37  The Commission is also responsible for investigating
economic sectors to determine their competitive strength and for
granting block exemptions under the competition statutes. The
structure of Article 101, concerning agreements, resembles an
American rule of reason analysis (with some important European
characteristics). The Commission must determine first whether the
agreement is "caught," or covered, by the prohibitions in Article
101(1) and then whether the agreement is exempt under Article
101(3) because the competitive benefits outweigh the threatened
harms.13 9
There was never any serious question whether the European
competition laws apply fully to the business of insurance. The
Commission stated in its Second Report on Competition Policy that
the insurance sector was covered by the full range of the European
Unions antitrust laws, and it rejected objections that the industry was
not suited to competition and would devolve into destructive
competition leading to failures and insolvency. 14 The critical
prerequisite for application of Article 81 is that the agreement affect
trade between EU member states, so European courts never
considered. whether "the business of insurance" operates "in
commerce" or whether the Commission had competence to enforce in
that sector. The answer is clearly in the affirmative.
However, as discussed above, the business of insurance has certain
characteristics that require special consideration in antitrust analysis.
136 Council Regulation 17/62, First Regulation Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty (now Articles 101 and 102), 1962 O.J. (13) 204 (EC).
. 137 Council Regulation 1/2003, on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition
Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1.
138 Id. at 5.
139 European Constitution, supra note 134, art. 101, at 88.
140 EUROPEAN COAL & STEEL CMTY. ET AL., SECOND REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 60-62 (1973), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual
report/ar 1972 en.pdf.
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Recognizing these special needs, the Commission granted two
individual exemptions in 1990 to permit insurance industry
cooperation and then granted a block exemption for the entire
industry in 1992. 14 That exemption expired in 2003 and was
replaced with another block exemption, which was due to expire in
2010 if not renewed.14 2  The McCarran-Ferguson Act, by
comparison, does not have an expiration date, and it was adopted by
the national legislature rather than the federal antitrust enforcement
agencies, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Trade
. - 143Commission.
The 2003 block exemption regulation for insurance (BER)
followed a Commission determination' .that cooperation among
insurers was necessary to share data, to calculate costs, to agree on
coverage, and to standardize forms and that these agreements were
likely to benefit consumers and competition. In contrast to the
general grant of immuniiy under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the
European BER protected six specific kinds of agreements.145 These
protected agreements included joint calculation of average costs for
specific risks, cooperation in studying the potential impact of external
conditions on future claims, joint creation of optional standardized
policy forms, joint data collection and distribution of profitability
models, voluntary insurance and reinsurance groups, and various
technical specifications.146 The BER specified detailed conditions
that-must be met for firms to be protected under the exemption, and it
explicitly excluded other categories of agreements from the
.147
exemption.
As part of the BER sunset provision, the Commission was required
to report to the European Parliament and Council on the operation of
141 Commission Regulation 3932/92, of 21 Dec. 1992, on the Application of Article
85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements, Decisions and Concerted
Practices in the Insurance Sector, 1992 O.J. (L 398) 7.
142 Commission Regulation 358/2003, of 27 Feb. 2003, on the Application of Article
81(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements, Decisions and Concerted
Practices in the Insurance Sector, 2003 O.J. (L 53) 8.
143 See 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2006).
144 Council Regulation 1534/91, on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to
Certain Categories of Agreements, Decisions and Concerted Practices in the Insurance
Sector, 1991 O.J. (L 143) 1 (EC). .
145 Commission Regulation 358/2003, supra note 142, at 11-12.
146 Id
147 See Financial Services: Overview, EUROPEAN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu
/competition/sectors/financial services/overview en.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
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the block exemption and to make recommendations' for future
reenactment, amendment, or elimination. 1 4 8  This multiyear process
was structured as a multistage official consultation. The Commission
began in 2007 by soliciting the views of the national competition
agencies of the member states. It then expanded its review into a
public consultation process, soliciting views and recommendations of
interest groups most likely to be affected, including consumer
organizations, national antitrust agencies, stakeholders, and industry
representatives, in April 2008, closing in July 2008.149 Thereafter,
the Commission issued a reporto50 and a working document,15 1
followed by a further public meeting to discuss the need for and the
specific requirements of insurance immunities.152 Issuing a final
report on a commission inquiry into the insurance sector and
previewing the consultative process on the soon-to-expire BER, the
Commission' warned that it "has yet to be persuaded that the
Regulation-which treats the insurance industry differently to other
industry sectors-is still necessary. However, it will review the
148 Council Regulation 1534/9 1, supra note 144.
149 By the close of this stage of the process in 2008, sixty comments had been received,
including comments from, among others, Association of British Insurers (ABI), Italian
Insurance Association (ANIA), Portuguese Association of Insurers (APS), I'Association
Frangaise de l'Assurance, European Federation of Insurance Intermediaries (BIPAR),
European Insurance and Reinsurance Federation (CEA), Central Union of Marine
Underwriters (CEFOR), Czech Insurance Association, Danish Insurance Association
(DIA), Fire Protection Association, German Insurance Association (GDV), Hellenic
Association of Insurance Companies, Lloyd's Market Association, National Bank of
Slovakia, Austrian Insurance Association (VVO), and Dutch Association of Insurers
(VVV). See Financial Services: Public Consultation on Insurance Block Exemption
Regulation, EUROPEAN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2008
insurance ber/index.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
150 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the
Functioning of Commission Regulation (EC) No. 358/2003 on the Application of Article
81(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements, Decisions and Concerted
Practices in the Insurance Sector, COM (2009) 138 final (Mar. 24, 2009) [hereinafter
Final Report], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM
:2009:0138:FIN:EN:PDF.
151 Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Report from the
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Functioning of
Commission Regulation (EC) No. 358/2003 on the Application of Article 81(3) of the
Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements, Decisions and Concerted Practices in the
Insurance Sector, SEC (2009) 364.
152 See Financial Services: Review ofFunctioning ofCommission Regulation 358/2003,
the Insurance Block Exemption Regulation, EUROPEAN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu
/competition/sectors/financial services/events/insurance ber.html (last visited Mar. 6,
2011).
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matter definitively in a report in March 2009."" While advising the
market participants to be prepared for the block exemption to sunset,
the Commission reiterated that industry practices would simply be
subject to the ordinary rules that apply to every other industrial sector,
and procompetitive practices would continue to be found
legitimate.1 54 Then DG Comp Commissioner Neelie Kroes affirmed
that "[i]f there are to be special rules for a particular sector, I need to
be convinced that they are justified in terms of bringing real benefits
to competition and to consumers."15 5  The general approach was
comprehensive, seeking to evaluate whether any special antitrust
immunity continued to be required and, if so, with respect to which
specific business practices. The Commission explained its approach:
The primary original objective of the BER no longer exists since
the adoption of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16
December 2002 which applies to all sectors including insurance.
Companies and associations must now assess for themselves
whether their agreements are compatible with Article 81. Only a
few sectors currently have a specific BER and the review process
has shown that they have ceased to be necessary in some sectors,
such as maritime and air transport, for which they have not been
renewed. As a result, the Commission approached the analysis in
the insurance sector by asking the following key questions:
a. Do issues in the insurance sector make it "special"
compared to other sectors and therefore lead to an enhanced
need for cooperation?
b. If so, does this enhanced need require a legal instrument to
protect or facilitate it?
c. If so, what is the most appropriate legal instg1gent, i.e. the
current BER, amended renewal or guidance?
153 Press Release, European Comm'n, Competition: Commission Issues Final Report on
Business Insurance Sector Inquiry, IP/07/1390 (Sept. 25, 2007).
154 Press Release, European Comm'n, Competition: Final Report of the Sector Inquiry
into Business Insurance: Frequently Asked Questions, Memo/07/382 (Sept. 25, 2007).
155 Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Examines Use of
Insurance Block Exemption Regulation, IP/08/596 (Apr. 17, 2008). The specific issues of
interest to the Commission include (1) whether, and in what circumstances, the block
exemption is used; (2) whether there are industry-specific conditions in the insurance
industry that make it different from other sectors that do not have individual block
exemptions; (3) whether the block exemption creates any anticompetitive effects; and (4)
whether eliminating the block exemption would make the industry more difficult to
supervise or impose a burden on antitrust enforcers. Id.
156 Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Preliminary Views on the
Renewal of Insurance Block Exemption Regulation, IP/09/470 (Mar. 24, 2009).
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The block exemption consultation process took a full two years of
consultation and evaluation, including a sector inquiry, and it finally
concluded in 2010 when the BER was partially renewed. Such a
critical inquiry serves the goals of antitrust policy, first, by
recognizing that broad exemptions are neither necessary under
modem analysis nor ordinarily warranted by the nature of a particular
industry and, second, by narrowly limiting the scope of any
exemption. At the close of the inquiry, the Commission struck a
balance and retreated from complete exemption to a more nuanced
regulation, reached against the backdiop of an important industry,
which comprised primary and reinsurers and accounted for some 375
billion euros in premiums annually.' 5 7 Among the areas of particular
concern were the coinsurance and reinsurance sectors generally. In
addition, the "best terms and conditions" clauses were flagged as a
potential issue because such clauses and practices could tend to raise
and stabilize premium prices.1 5 9 The Final Report criticized a variety
of practices but did not identify any as specifically illegal under the
European Union's competition law.160 Instead, the report concluded
by warning members of the insurance sector that it would continue to
monitor competition and invite firms to consult further about the
value of the practices. 16 Notably, however, the Sector Report
highlights the sector block exemption and warns that "[i]nsurers
should be prepared ... for the possibility that the BER might not be
renewed."
Ultimately, the Commission was partially convinced, and it chose
to renew two of the four categories of agreements that had been
covered by the 2003 BER: (1) joint compilations, tables, and studies
and (2) coinsurance or reinsurance pools.163 Exemptions for standard
policy conditions and security devices were not renewed.164
157 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions-Sector
Inquiry Under Article 17 ofthe Regulation, at 2, COM (2007) 556 final (Sept. 25, 2007).
158 Id. at 4-5.
159 Id at 4.
160 See Final Report, supra note 150.
161 Id. at 8-9.
162 Press Release, European Comm'n, supra note 154, at 4.
163 Commission Regulation 267/2010, on the Application of Article 101(3) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Certain Categories of Agreements,
Decisions, and Concerted Practices in the Insurance Sector, 2010 O.J. (L 83) 1.
16 4 Id.
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The Commission's process is particularly sound. Instead of
approaching the exemption piecemeal, the Commission took a
deliberate approach, preparing and disseminating a questionnaire,
holding hearings and taking written comments, and following up as
the review proceeded.165 The review was essentially de novo; it was,
in the Commission's words, a "first principles" approach to determine
whether any of the individual exemptions were still valid. Instead
of presuming that the business of insurance is unique, the
Commission inquired:
(a) whether the business risks or other issues in the insurance
sector make it 'special' and different to other sectors such that
this leads to an enhanced need for cooperation amongst
insurers;
(b) if so, whether this enhanced need for cooperation requires a
legal instrument such as the BER to protect or facilitate it; and
(c) if so, [whether t current BER] is the most appropriate legal
instrument ... .1
Even without the block exemption, concerted industry practices,
data exchanges, production of optional standardized forms, and other
agreements among insurers would not necessarily violate the
European antitrust laws. In this respect, the European law is
comparable to the American law; agreements that are procompetitive
and appropriately limited would likely be legal under modem rule of
reason analysis, even if they are not protected by broad antitrust
immunity. The Commission underlined the risk of leaving an
unnecessary and overbroad exemption in place:
There is a risk that the BER inadvertently exempts some
restrictive conduct. For example, this may be the case in certain
markets for security devices, which are artificially closed to
competition by collective non-recognition of these devices by
insurers.
Common standards aid switching between insurers, but at the
same time there is a potential for abuse. This is the problem with
form-based exemptions such as the BER, and explains why there
165 Press Release, European Comm'n, supra note 154.
166 Communication from the Commission on the Application of Article 101(3) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Certain Categories of Agreements,
Decisions and Concerted Practices in the Insurance Sector, 2010 O.J. (C 82) 20. The
communication states that "a specific legal instrument such as a BER should only be
adopted if cooperation in the insurance sector is 'special' and different to other sectors
which do not benefit from a BER (i.e. most sectors currently)." Id.
167 Id
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should be as much scope as possible for ap gffects-based approach
consistent with the need for legal certainty.
VI
INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING
The European approach to a broad, sector-specific exemption from
the antitrust laws is consistent with the modem approach and
benchmarks of international organizations. The ICN is a virtual
organization of the more than ninety national competition authorities
and enforcement agencies worldwide. This organization serves as
a forum for competition advocacy, organizes training programs for
new agencies, and works to romulgate consensus on substantive and
procedural antitrust issues.1
The ICN is now just a decade old, and it has focused its early work
on antitrust issues that are most important and likely to gain broad
agreement. However, the interface between competition and
regulation was addressed at the third annual meeting, held in Seoul in
2004, and the ICN Regulated Sectors Working Group produced
reports on competition in a variety of regulated sectors. The Working
Group acknowledged the potentially productive role of regulated
industries in market economies, but it recommended that regulation
be limited to situations of market failure because "regulation and
antitrust enforcement pursue distinct aims and affect different aspects
of business conduct."17' In addition, the report points out that "[t]he
solution to 'exempt' regulated sectors from the application of antitrust
rules has been progressively abandoned in most countries also as a
result of technical progress allowing competition in natural monopoly
environments." t7 2
The business of insurance is probably not such a "natural
monopoly." Technical progress in evaluating data should make the
sector function more efficiently, to the benefit of consumers, but it
has not yet created new products or business forms to compete in the
168 Press Release, European Comm'n, supra note 154, at 5.
169 INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, ICN FACTSHEET AND KEY MESSAGES (2009),
available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploadslibrary/doc608.pdf.
170 Id.
171 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN REGULATED SECTORS WORKING GRP., INT'L




HeinOnline  -- 89 Or. L. Rev. 946 2010-2011
Competition and Regulation in the Insurance Sector
sector.17 3 Therefore, regulation and some form of antitrust immunity
to make the regulation work in these sectors are more justifiable. The
ICN generally favors effective antitrust enforcement to increase
consumer welfare, supplemented by regulation as appropriate to deal
with market failure.17 4
The OECD has provided sophisticated analysis and
recommendations on competition laws of individual states and on
broad policy issues. A 1998 policy roundtable on competition and the
insurance industry surveyed the state of law and regulatory issues in
OECD countries and made some relevant recommendations for more
effective competition policies.175 The majority of countries reported
that their antitrust laws applied without exemption to the insurance
sector but that special characteristics and requirements of the
insurance industry were considered in evaluating particular cases.
Overall, experts concluded that any restrictive industry practices must
improve the market and benefit consumers.177  In particular,
information sharing and agreements on coinsurance and reinsurance
were generally considered efficient and legitimate, depending on the
circumstances of each agreement.17 8
The OECD found that the majority of jurisdictions with "modem
antitrust laws" analyzed agreements in the insurance sector on a case-
by-case basis under the rule of reason. 1 7 9  The report noted that
"[c]ountries with older competition laws tend to have older, overly-
broad legislative exemptions for the insurance sector. Reform in such
countries will involve replacing these broad exemptions with targeted,




174 See id at 2-5.
175 See COMM. ON COMPETITION & POLICY, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV.,
POLICY ROUNDTABLES: COMPETITION AND RELATED REGULATION ISSUES IN THE
INSURANCE INDUSTRY 11 (1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/25
/1920099.pdf.
176 Id at 10-11.
177 Id. at 7.
178 Id. at 10-11.
179 Id. at 11.
180 Id
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CONCLUSION
The most serious issue surrounding the McCarran-Ferguson Act
and other legislative grants of antitrust immunity is that such laws
may act as a "one-way ratchet" by expanding but not limiting the
scope of the exemption.s The McCarran-Ferguson Act has been
criticized from all sides since its adoption more than sixty years ago.
Consumer agencies and state attorneys general argue for total repeal,
the Antitrust Modernization Commission deplores antitrust
exemptions generally and recommends limited use, and the American
Bar Association urges replacement with a more limited exemption
tailored to modem antitrust learning.182 Representatives of the
insurance sector argue the necessity for various joint activities and a
broad immunity protecting their collective action.' There is real
force to these claims, but the McCarran-Ferguson Act's generous
immunity may be overbroad and unnecessary to achieve those
procompetitive benefits. Nevertheless, once embedded in the law,
exemptions are difficult to remove despite criticism of the immunity,
confusion among the courts, and proffers of compromise. Congress
has not demonstrated serious commitment to reform the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, and it gave only limited attention to the issue until a
recent flurry of proposed legislation. The draft legislation varies
widely and includes efforts to narrow the immunity, to repeal it
altogether, and in one creative new approach, to preempt state
authority over the industry and impose optional federal regulation. It
is too soon to predict whether any of these proposals for reform will
be adopted, but the testimony of various stakeholders at the single
hearing was sharply divided despite important developments in
antitrust analysis that protect core cooperative activity under the rule
of reason.
Legal, financial, economic, and social issues invariably interrelate.
The business of insurance is not alone in facing economic challenges,
but it has been particularly affected. This crisis was anticipated by
181 This approach comes from Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), a Voting
Rights Act case holding that Congress had the power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to halt New York City's use of a state literacy test. The Court stated that
Congress had wide discretion to carry out the rights guaranteed by the Amendment. Id. at
651 n.10. Footnote 10 clarified the reach of congressional authority, stating that Congress
had the power to expand rights but not to decrease them, the so-called "one-way ratchet."
Id.
182 See supra notes 20, 40-43 and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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and motivated the proposed legislation that would have both repealed
the McCarran-Ferguson antitrust exemption and affirmatively
preempted state regulation of the business of insurance for those
global firms that choose a national regulatory system. Such a
dramatic change to the current legal and regulatory landscape was a
provocative response and deserves serious discussion. It should not
be underestimated as merely changing the scope of antitrust law or
tinkering with exemptions. Preemption of a historic, state-regulated
field, even if partial, would alter the longstanding pattern of state
regulation over an important economic sector, and it would challenge
the allocation of power and deference between the states and federal
roles. American stakeholders (the ABA, state attorneys general,
consumer groups, and insurance organizations and firms) and
international organizations have made important contributions to the
McCarran-Ferguson antitrust immunity discussion. At the end of the
day, however, some consensus can be found: antitrust laws are a
consumer-welfare prescription, antitrust exemptions should be
narrowly construed and adopted when necessary to remedy market
failures, and data dissemination and other agreements in the business
of insurance are likely procompetitive when analyzed under the rule
of reason. The insurance block exemption in Europe was a mixed
result, but in the absence of more consensus on a particular option, the
one-way ratchet describes the status of antitrust immunity in
American antitrust law-once an exemption has been granted and
embedded in the law, it is likely to remain.
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